In this paper I try to establish the relevance of Peirce's Semeiotics to the conceptual foundations of Cognitive Science. Given Cognitive Science's commitment to the Representational Theory of Mind, I try to clarify the nature of mental representation from the standpoint of Peirce's general theory of signs. As it turns out, mental representations, because of their special role as interpretants of non-mental signs, present especial problems for their interpretation, whose solution Peirce anticipated in a way very close to that developed (...) in Cognitive Science. (shrink)

According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how :147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78:439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist :7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind, we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, (...) insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how are a viable option, there is an overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active externalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper explores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowledge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in when one knows how to do something, and how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance. (shrink)

In a classical paper [15] V. Glivenko showed that a proposition is classically demonstrable if and only if its double negation is intuitionistically demonstrable. This result has an algebraic formulation: the double negation is a homomorphism from each Heyting algebra onto the Boolean algebra of its regular elements. Versions of both the logical and algebraic formulations of Glivenko’s theorem, adapted to other systems of logics and to algebras not necessarily related to logic can be found in the literature (see [2, (...) 9, 8, 14] and [13, 7, 14]). The aim of this paper is to offer a general frame for studying both logical and algebraic generalizations of Glivenko’s theorem. We give abstract formulations for quasivarieties of algebras and for equivalential and algebraizable deductive systems and both formulations are compared when the quasivariety and the deductive system are related. We also analyse Glivenko’s theorem for compatible expansions of both cases. (shrink)

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...) psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms. (shrink)

The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: “... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress.” – the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the ‘challenges’ was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out our neck (...) and formulate the challenges for artificial cognitive systems. These challenges are articulated in terms of a definition of what a cognitive system is: a system that learns from experience and uses its acquired knowledge (both declarative and practical) in a flexible manner to achieve its own goals. (shrink)

This book, in the case study tradition, examined the lived experiences of 12 former high school students who participated in an exchange trip to Argentina, in connection with intercultural competency development.

The anonimous scholiumOn all forms of syllogism was copied in 1884 from the Paris Codex 2064 by E. Richter. In 1899 M. Wallies published it in the preface to Ammonius' commentary on the Prior Analytics of Aristotle. There appear in that scholium, apart from the complex figure of Galenos, other characteristic forms of inference.Among these forms I found five so-called non-demonstrable stoic syllogisms, three modifications of the law of transposition of which the third is not mentioned by the authors of (...) Princ pia Mathematica, and a modification of the form of inference known as Euclid's law. This form of inference was applied by Euclid in mathematics and by Saccherius in syllogistics; it is mentioned for the first time by Cardan in a treatise of 1570 and later by Clavius in his commentary of 1574 on the Elements of Euclid and in the commentary on Theodosius'Sphaerica of the year 1586.In 1658 Erhard Weigel made the first attempt at refuting the logical law of Euclid as formulated by Cardan and Clavius and in 1686 James Bernoulli tried to prove it. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to develop a paradigm in problem solving where the notion of virtuality plays a central role. Following a brief discussion on virtual simulation, the paper attempts to identify a notion of virtuality based on the identification of the self (man or computer) with the problem solver. It is shown that such an identification/distinction possibly violates some general principle of the problem environment.To deal with this violation, a new problem is generated and a new virtualization act (...) is required, in order to attain a correspondence between virtuality and reality. A better understanding of this approach requires a combination of analog and digital reasoning: the analog being related to the environment in which the problem solving is required, and the digital to the problem solver's “mental” activities.We will briefly analyze the recursive approach to problem solving and suggest a possible problem solving methodology based on virtuality. The paper concludes with comments on the relation between etnology and virtual reality. (shrink)

The “systematicity argument” has been used to argue for a classical cognitive architecture (Fodor in The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, London, 1975, Why there still has to be a language of thought? In Psychosemantics, appendix. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 135–154, 1987; Fodor and Pylyshyn in Cognition 28:3–71, 1988; Aizawa in The systematicity arguments. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 2003). From the premises that cognition is systematic and that the best/only explanation of systematicity is compositional structure, it concludes that cognition is (...) to be explained in terms of symbols (in a language of thought) and formal rules. The debate, with connectionism, has mostly centered on the second premise-whether an explanation of systematicity requires compositional structure, which neural networks do not to exhibit (for example, Hadley and Hayward, in Minds and Machines, 7:1–37). In this paper, I will take issue with the first premise. Several arguments will be deployed that show that cognition is not systematic in general; that, in fact, systematicity seems to be related to language. I will argue that it is just verbal minds that are systematic, and they are so because of the structuring role of language in cognition. A dual-process theory of cognition will be defended as the best explanation of the facts. (shrink)

This paper takes Franco's Spain to be a powerful case study for analyzing the ways in which power shapes science and technology and is shaped by them in return. Spain was the last country in Western Europe to establish closer links with any of the international cooperative institutions emerging after WWII. As such, developments internal to Spanish society were quite autonomous and relatively free from foreign influences. The paper focuses first on the brand new, powerful institution that the Francoist regime (...) created to promote scientific research under tight political control, the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. Next it turns to applied science and technology, top priorities for the regime's state-supported programs of industrialization. They were implemented through the politically and financially powerful Instituto Nacional de Industria. Using diplomatic sources, the paper next argues that, until the late 1950s, Spain maintained substantial political and economic isolation essentially because the regime bet on autarkic policies and a model of largely isolated development. In this model, it was crucial for the regime to develop its own technological and scientific resources. Finally, the paper examines how the regime fostered a new Spanish identity in which science had a new role. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is the variety generated by the class of finite simple bounded BCK-algebras. To obtain these results we prove that every simple algebra in the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is also a relatively simple bounded BCK-algebra. Moreover, we show that every simple bounded BCK-algebra can be embedded into a simple integral commutative bounded residuated lattice. We extend our main results to some richer subreducts of the class (...) of integral commutative bounded residuated lattices and to the involutive case. (shrink)

In this paper I try to establish the relevance of Peirce's Semeiotics to the conceptual foundations of Cognitive Science. Given Cognitive Science's commitment to the Representational Theory of Mind, I try to clarify the nature of mental representation from the standpoint of Peirce's general theory of signs. As it turns out, mental representations, because of their special role as interpretants of non-mental signs, present especial problems for their interpretation, whose solution Peirce anticipated in a way very close to that developed (...) in Cognitive Science. (shrink)

This study aims to analyze the different translations and interpretations of χώρα that appears in Chalcius’ Commentary on Timaeus, for demonstrate that all modifications of the original platonic text was introduced with the purpose to associate the Timaeus with the Old Testament. With this aim, we analyze five points: Chalcidius’s substitution of χώρα by ὕλη the relation among the space and the second genre of the being; the identity between matter and nothing; the relations among matter, intellect and necessity; and (...) the problems of the human perception. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analizan los argumentos de Berkeley a favor del inmaterialismo. Especial atención se dedica al argumento a priori que subyace en el lema esse est percipi, y sobre todo a la manera en que Berkeley entiende el concepto de existencia y el valor metafísico que otorga a su significación. Asimismo, se explica también cómo este inmaterialismo es un espiritualismo o realismo teológico puesto al servicio de causas apologéticas.

L’article passe en revue le développement de l’histoire des femmes au Moyen Âge en Espagne depuis ses origines, la fin des années 1970, et discute l’influence que les thèses de Georges Duby ont exercée sur elle. Il relève que les regards venus de l’étranger ont contribué à discréditer et faire abandonner les préoccupations nationalistes qui avaient longtemps obsédé l’historiographie autochtone jusque dans la façon d’envisager et représenter les femmes. Le long et fécond parcours de l’histoire des femmes dans les vingt (...) dernières années est alors examiné, depuis l’orientation fondamentalement juridique et positiviste qui a marqué ses débuts jusqu’aux recherches récentes sur l’identité et la subjectivité féminines ou aux polémiques sur le pouvoir des femmes et leur participaton à la vie politique. La portée des thèses de G. Duby dans cette évolution ainsi que les critiques qu’elles se sont attirées sont finalement considérées. (shrink)

While a standard procedure in mental health internment facilities, physical restraint, as an extreme form of coercion in mental health, has been claimed to be abolished. Three sorts of arguments have been provided: an argument from dignity, and argument from informed consent, and a consequentialism argument. In this chapter we discuss these arguments and conclude that these arguments are not decisive to completely ban such forms of coercion. Restraint, in particular, may be justified in exceptional circumstances, where an imminent risk (...) for the personal integrity of anybody involved, including the person with the mental health problem. However, this sort of case is infrequent, while restraint is often the first option. This conclusion also suggests that much can be done to prevent reaching such extreme circumstances where coercion may be the only option. The discussion also clarifies how coercion should be carried out, when justified, making it supervised and as short as possible. (shrink)

We argue that Anderson's (MRH) needs further development in several directions. First, a thoroughgoing criticism of the several alternatives is required. Second, the course between the Scylla of full holism and the Charybdis of structural-functional modularism must be plotted more distinctly. Third, methodologies better suited to reveal brain circuits must be brought in. Finally, the constraints that naturalistic settings provide should be considered.